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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
On the twenty-eighth of July, 1965, the Federal Communications
Commission issued a "Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast
Hearings" (1965 Policy Statement).' The statement set out certain
criteria to be applied in comparative cases, but a footnote to the docu-
ment stated that it did not attempt to deal with problems raised where
an applicant was in a contest with a licensee seeking renewal of his li-
cense.2 Nevertheless, almost immediately the concepts of the policy
statement came into use in situations where a new applicant was com-
peting with a licensee seeking renewal-a development which might
reasonably have been expected because the statutory test to be applied
in all license cases is the same. 3
Among other matters, the 1965 Policy Statement promulgated the
doctrine that in a comparative situation an applicant not associated with
other media interests should be given preferential consideration of pri-
mary significance as against applicants having other interests, 4 and fur-
ther that an applicant proposing an operation in which the owners
would actively participate on a day-to-day basis should receive a prefer-
ence of substantial importance.5 Although many stations are owned
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1. 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 5 P & F Radio Reg. 2d 1901 (1965).
2. Id. at 393 n.1, 5 P & F Radio Reg. 2d at 1907 n.1.
3. See note 40 infra and accompanying text.
4. 1 F.C.C.2d at 394, 5 P & F Radio Reg. 2d at 1901.
5. Id. at 395, 5 P & F Radio Reg. 2d at 1909.
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by group owners, having been licensed in accordance with Commission
regulations providing for multiple ownership within certain specified
limitations,0 the possibility that the 1965 Policy Statement might pro-
vide the means of restructuring the ownership of broadcast stations
throughout the country received scant attention until the issuance in
January 1969 of the Commission's decision in WHDH, Inc.7 In that
case, the management of a station which had been in operation for
more than a dozen years, albeit under rather special circumstances,8
was displaced by a new applicant.
The opinion of the Commission and a concurring statement in the
WHDH case caused alarm and reverberations which still continue.9
Many bills were introduced in Congress for the stated purpose of re-
storing confidence and stability in the industry. In January 1970,
the Federal Communications Commission issued a new Policy State-
ment designed to give renewal applicants. with good records a measure
of protection as such against competing applicants. 10 This Statement
was overruled on judicial review as depriving competing applicants of
adequate hearing rights." Bills introduced in Congress .to alleviate the
problem have had generally rough going due largely to the difficulty
encountered in attempting to find a method of giving appropriate assur-
ances to the incumbent licensees without at the same time denying new
applicants a fair hearing opportunity. Separate bills passed in the
House and Senate died with the last Congress.' 2 It now appears that
6. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.35 (AM), -.240 (FM), -.636 (TV) (1973).
7. 16 F.C.C.2d 1, 15 P & F Radio Reg. 2d 411 (1969), affd sub nom. Greater
Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S.
923 (1971).
8. See notes 83-85 infra and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Jaffe, WHDH: The FCC and Broadcasting License Renewal, 82
HADv. L REv. 1693 (1969); $3 Billion in Stations Down the Drain?, BROADCASTING,
Feb. 3, 1969, at 19.
10. Policy Statement Concerning Comparative Hearings Involving Regular Renewal
Applicants, 22 F.C.C.2d 424, 18 P & F Radio Reg. 2d 1901 (1970).
11. Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
See generally Federal Administrative Law Developments-1971, 1972 DuKE L.J. 115,
182-94.
12. Broadcast License Renewal Act, H.R. 12993, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). The
bill was reported from the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on
March 28, 1974, H.R. RP. No. 961, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), and passed by the
House on May 1, 1974. In the Senate, the measure was reported out by the Commerce
Committee on Sept. 27, 1974, S. REP. No. 1190, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), and passed
the Senate as amended on Oct. 8, 1974. The Senate requested a conference on the
same date, but the measure "died at the end of the session" because of the refusal of
Foreign Commerce Committee Chairman Harley 0. Staggers to send the House bill to
conference, 32 CoNo. Q. WEEKLY REP. 3437 (1974). Both versions of the bill
required a five-year term for license grants. The House version was designed to assure
(Vol. 1975:253
Vol. 1975:253] BROADCAST RENEWAL HEARINGS
the only possibility of prompt remedial attention must come through
re-examination of Commission procedures with respect to comparative
hearings.
As a general proposition, it would seem that the hearing process
should provide the means of establishing the factual basis for decision
through the application of the test provided by law. If, as widely be-
lieved in the industry, decisions after hearings are not fair to competing
parties, and if, for that reason, the results are not consistent with the
public interest, there is obviously cause to examine the procedures em-
ployed in the hearing process. This Article undertakes both to exam-
ine the hearing process of the Commission relating to contests between
competing broadcast applicants as it has evolved and to suggest changes
in approach as shown to be necessary.
PRE-1965: THE Johnston Broadcasting DOCTRINE
The Federal Communications Commission is authorized to grant
applications for authorizations to construct broadcast stations and to is-
sue licenses, including renewal licenses, only upon findings that public
interest, convenience, and necessity will be served by such grants.
This test was first established in the Radio Act of 1927' s and has been
applicable since 1934 under the current Communications Act of
1934.14  Where an application is unopposed, the public interest test
becomes a matter of determining whether an applicant is qualified un-
der certain statutory requirements and has presented a proposal which
is in compliance with the Commission's regulations, including certain
regulations applicable to preparation of applications.' 5 Where, how-
ever, two or more applicants file competing or mutually exclusive' 6 ap-
a renewal applicant of success "where overall during the expiring term of its license,
it has provided good service. . . and its broadcast operations have not been marked by
serious deficiencies." H.R. REP,. No. 961, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1974). "Good" was
defined as equivalent to "substantial" in the 1970 Policy Statement. Id. The Senate
bill created a "presumption" in favor of renewal. See 32 CoNG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2569
(1974). For a discussion of some of the legislative proposals during the last session,
see FCC Broadcast License Renewal Reform: Two Comments on Recent Legislative
Proposals, 42 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 67 (1973).
13. Ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927).
14. 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-29 (1970).
15. See, e.g., Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Appli-
cants, 27 F.C.C.2d 650, 21 P & F Radio Reg. 2d 1507 (1971); Report and Statement Re:
Commission En Banc Programming Inquiry, 20 P & F Radio Reg. 1902 (1960).
16. Mutually exclusive applications are those filed "at about the same time for the
use of electronically interfering facilities." Anthony, Towards Simplicity and Rational-
ity in Comparative Broadcast Licensing Proceedings, 24 STAN. L. RPv. 1, 3 n.1 (1971).
For an excellent discussion of the technical background of frequency allocation, see Id.
at 7-10.
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plications for the same operating assignment or channel, this statutory
test becomes more. complex. The difficulty results in part from the
fact that competing applicants often include incumbents, thus raising
the question of how much significance should be attached to the operat-
ing records and experience gained by this latter group. The complex-
ity of the selection process is also due to the fact that, where there
are competing applicants, any one of which (absent conflict with an-
other application) could be accepted as in the public interest, the ap-
plication of the statutory test is necessarily a comparative matter:
"Since the number of channels is limited and the number of persons
desiring to broadcast is far greater than can be accommodated, the Com-
mission must determine from among the applicants before it which of
them will, if licensed, best serve the public.''
The relative nature of the public interest standard as applicable
to comparative hearings early led the courts and the Commission to
two logical conclusions about the selection process, as set forth in the
landmark case of Johnston Broadcasting Co. v. FCC:
(1) Since the comparative process focuses on differences be-
tween applicants, there necessarily can be no preconceived set of cri-
teria existing apart from and uniformly applied to the -facts of each
case.
19
(2) Since the comparative process weighs all material differences
between candidates (i.e., differences which reflect on capacity to pro-
vide service in the public interest),20 the criteria for ordering and
evaluating those differences can be given no uniform weights or priori-
ties apart from the facts of each case.
Aside from suggesting that reliance on preconceived criteria to gener-
ate and evaluate evidence was inconsistent with the comparative hear-
ing process, the court in Johnston Broadcasting also suggested two
more serious risks:
(1) Reliance upon such a list would mean that much immaterial
evidence (i.e., evidence upon which no differences existed between
the parties) would be gathered, with the result that "the complexity,
length and expense of proceedings would be vastly increased wholly
unnecessarily."'21
17. FEDERAL RADIO COMMISSION, SECOND ANNuAL REPORT 169 (1928).
18. 175 F.2d 351, 357 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
19. Id. at 357-58 (wherein the court emphasized the "difficulty, if not the im-
possibility, of defining a list of things in respect to which applicants may differ").
20. Id. at 357 (wherein the court stated the Commission's obligation to make
findings of fact with respect to every difference, "except those which are frivolous or
wholly unsubstantial").
21. Id. at 358.
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(2) Reliance upon such a list would run the risk of reversible er-
ror insofar as material differences in some cases might fall outside of
the set criteria and thus be excluded from the ultimate findings of
fact.22
Even though Johnston Broadcasting warned against reliance on an
all-inclusive, uniform list of criteria, it was only natural for a number
of such criteria to evolve from the cases and to become informally
accepted as usual indicators of material differences between applicants.
Criteria which would not involve difficult subjective judgments as to
fitness and quality of programs would, of course, be preferred by hear-
ing officials. Hence, by the early 1950's, the following standard com-
parative criteria had developed:
(1) Integration of ownership and management (i.e., the extent
of an applicant's proposed participation in the day-to-day operation of
the station);
(2) nature of ownership (i.e., the character and previous broad-
cast experience of an applicant and the extent of his involvement in
the affairs of the principal community of license);
(3) concentration or diversification of ownership (i.e., the extent
of an applicant's ownership interest irk other mass communications
media);
(4) previous broadcast record; and
(5) program and staffing proposals.
Since these and other comparative issues with respect to which
applicants might differ were accorded no evidentiary weight apart from
the facts of a particular case, decisions were reached only after a thor-
ough inquiry into the public interest considerations of the community
to be served. Thus, the factors of decisional significance varied from
case to case. As between -two competing applicants for an AM station,
for example, both adequately staffed and proposing programs ade-
quate to meet the needs of the local community, the concentration of
ownership issue represented the major difference. In one such case
the Commission found that competition in the community would not
be encouraged should one of the applicants be licensed, inasmuch as
its chief stockholder was also general manager of the other existing
local station.23 However, another comparative hearing case involving
an applicant who also owned an AM station in the same community
22. Id.
23. Carolina Advertising Corp., 6 F.C.C. 230 (1938).
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attached little significance to this factor.2 The competition provided
by "a number of other radio and television stations" in the prospective
community of license was deemed to diminish the importance of this
concentration of ownership issue;25 at the same time, a competing ap-
plicant's previous experience in operating a VHF station in the same
community was considered most significant "because [such prior ex-
perience] deals with knowledge of a type that can be gained in no
other way as to how the facility can best be used in the course of day-
to-day operation, to serve the interests and desires of a community."2 6
In yet a third case (Johnston Broadcasting itself), the Commission
looked to the issue of programming, there being no other material dif-
ferences between applicants." While both competitors proposed to air
contrasting viewpoints on controversial matters, the Commission found
that the broadcast record of only one exhibited actual efforts in this
direction, through such past practices as offering assistance to civic
groups in their preparation of local live debates and discussions and
as airing such programs during "good listening hours" without charge.28
As endorsed in Johnston Broadcasting, all applicants during the
pre-1965 period were subject to comparative evaluation on a case-by-
case basis with one exception-where renewal applicants were among
competing applicants. Assuming a satisfactory record of past perform-
ance, this latter group was favored for -two reasons. First, as a practical
matter, an applicant's past -broadcast record was deemed a more re-
liable indicator of future service in the public interest than a new ap-
plicant's untested proposals.2 9 This approach necessarily meant that
the renewal applicant's past record became the single most important
consideration among the standard comparative criteria and was thus ac-
corded a significance independent of the facts of any particular case.
Second, as a matter of public policy it was deemed desirable to reward
incumbents for good public service with certainty of renewal:
When a broadcasting station has been constructed, necessarily at con-
siderable cost, and has been maintained and operated to the satisfaction
of its listeners, it is ordinarily in the public interest that the station con-
tinue to operate, and a renewal of its license should not be refused un-
24. Television Broadcasters, Inc., 27 F.C.C. 727 (1959).
25. Id. at 760.
26. Id. at 761.
27. Johnston Broadcasting Co., 12 F.C.C. 517 (1947), affd, 175 F.2d 351 (D.C.
Cir. 1949).
28. Id. at 524.
29. Hearst Radio, Inc. (WBAL), 15 F.C.C. 1149, 1175-76 (1951).
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less there exist as a basis for the refusal what this court has called "com-
pelling reasons."3 0
As the argument goes, the incentive of almost certain renewal en-
courages qualified persons to become and remain broadcast licensees;
this in turn is reflected in better service to the community of license.
On the other hand, to place the incumbent on a par with new applicants
is to subject the former to the "pretensions of a newcomer, which can
mold its claims to achieve superiority in a certain area over its opponent
whose case is to a large extent frozen by its current operation." 1 The
uncertainty of this situation might discourage qualified broadcasters
from remaining in the field while serving as "an inducement to the
opportunist who might seek a license and then provide the barest mini-
mum of service which would permit short run maximization of profit,
on the theory that the license might be terminated whether he rendered
a good service or not. 32
In short, this bias was intended to equalize the competitive posi-
tion of the incumbent, who is tied to his past record of performance,
vis-h-vis the new applicant, who is free to fashion more desirable, albeit
untested, proposals. The effect, however, was more extreme, for the
renewal applicant came to have "virtually insuperable advantage on the
basis of his past broadcast record per se."33  Hearst Radio, Inc.
(WBAL) 34 is a typical case in point. Here the new applicant, Public
Service Radio (PSR), was preferable to incumbent Hearst on the basis
of the following standard criteria:
(1) Integration of ownership and management (one of PSR's
principal stockholders would take a very active part in the operation
of the station while there existed no such personal involvement by
Hearst's stockholders);
(2) nature of ownership (PSR's stockholders were much more
personally involved in local civic activities and exhibited a greater di-
versification in background); and
(3) diversification of ownership (Hearst, besides having owner-
ship or control of newspapers and periodicals across the country, was
30. WOKO, Inc. v. FCC, 153 F.2d 623, 629-30 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd on other grounds,
329 U.S. 223 (1946).
31. Wabash Valley Broadcasting Corp. (WTHI-TV), 35 F.C.C. 677, 709 (1963).
32. Policy Statement Concerning Comparative Hearings Involving Regular Renewal
Applicants, 22 F.C.C.2d 424, 425, 18 P & F Radio Reg. 2d 1901, 1904 (1970).
33. Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1208 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
34. 15 F.C.C. 1149 (1951).
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a licensee of broadcast facilities in three different communities; PSR's
stockholders had no ownership interest in any broadcast station).3 5
Despite PSR's superiority in the above criteria and Hearst's "unexcep-
tional record of past programming performance, '3 6 Hearst's license was
renewed because its programming constituted a known quantity in -the
public interest "when compared to the risks attendant on the execution
of the proposed programming of Public Service Radio Corporation, ex-
cellent though the proposal may be."'37
The only serious challenge to -this liberal renewal practice was
made on the substantive ground that it constituted a violation of stat-
utory language in section 307(d) of the Communications Act of
1934,38 which provided that "action of -the Commission with reference
to the granting of such application for the renewal of a license shall
be limited to and governed by the same considerations and practice
which affect the granting of original applications."3 9 Despite the force
of this contention, the Commission was able to argue that new and re-
newal applicants were in fact adjudged on the same ultimate considera-
tion, i.e., the consideration of public interest, convenience, and neces-
sity:
Although this section might be given such a literal construction as to
eliminate from consideration the record of an existing licensee seeking
renewal when in a comparative hearing with a new applicant, we do not
believe that such limited interpretation would be consonant with the
overriding requirement of the Communications Act that the public in-
terest be the controlling consideration in the Commission's determina-
tion. So viewed it is manifest that the Commission cannot disregard the
record of a licensee any more than it could ignore any other pertinent
indicia.4 0
In apparent recognition and tacit endorsement of this tilt in favor of
the incumbent, 41 Congress shortly after Hearst removed the embarras-
sing language of section 307(d) and replaced it with the more general
requirement that new and renewal applications alike be evaluated ac-
35. Id. at 1180-81.
36. Id. at 1177.
37. Id. at 1183.
38. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 307(d), 48 Stat. 1084, as amended,
47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1970).
39. Id.
40. 15 F.C.C. at 1175.
41. H.R. REP. No. 1750, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1952), in which the Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce concluded that the language removed "is neither
realistic nor does it reflect the way in which the Commission actually has handled re-
newal cases."
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cording to the public interest, convenience, and necessity. 2 It was not
until two decades later that -this practice was successfully challenged,
this -time on procedural grounds.43
1965 AND THEREAFTER: A SEARCH FOR STABILITY
By the late 1950's the Commission practice of weighing all ma-
terial differences and according relative weights on a case-by-case basis
began to show signs of strain. In several dissents by then junior Circuit
Judge David Bazelon of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Ap-
peals,44 the diversification of ownership issue was characterized as "one
of the basic underlying considerations in the enactment of the Com-
munications Act,"45 and thus a more important factor in the selection
process than such other comparative criteria as proposed programming.
For example, Judge Bazelon argued in Tennessee Television, Inc. v.
FCC46 that the Commission's award of a new license to an applicant,
whose broadcasting experience and prior record of service were
deemed to outweigh the integration and diversification preferences
awarded a competitor, "effectively nullified the diversification and anti-
monopoly policy" of the Commission, since attributes of the favored ap-
plicant were the "by-products of concentration."4 7 In short, there is the
novel suggestion here, ultimately to be accepted by the Commission,
48
that
(1) diversification of ownership is a matter of basic Commission
policy and hence can be accorded a high degree of importance apart
from the facts of any specific comparative competition; and
(2) diversification of ownership, if it is an issue, should be ac-
corded a preference over broadcast experience or prior service where
the latter two criteria are the product of an applicant's other media in-
terests.
42. 47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1970) (originally enacted as Act of July 15, 1952, ch. 879,
§ 5, 66 Stat. 714).
43. Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
44. Tennessee Television, Inc. v. FCC, 262 F.2d 28, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Pinellas
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 230 F.2d 204, 209 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1007
(1956).
45. Tennessee Television, Inc. v. FCC, 262 F.2d 28, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1958), quoting
Multiple Ownership, F.C.C. Report and Order, 18 Fed. Reg. 7796, 7797 (1953); Pinellas
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 230 F.2d 204, 211 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1007
(1956), quoting Multiple Ownership, supra at 7797.
46. 262 F.2d at 32.
47. Id.
48. Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 394, 396,
398, 5 P & F Radio Reg. 2d 1901, 1908, 1910, 1912 (1965).
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That such a reassessment of the Johnston Broadcasting doctrine had
begun at the Commission was acknowledged as early as 1956 by the
majority in Pinellas Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.4" By 1960, the diversifi-
fication of ownership issue appeared to have taken on primary signifi-
cance with the majority of the Commissioners, at least insofar as new
competing applicants were concerned.50
Even, before the ownership issue had begun to assume greater
quantitative significance in the weighing with other comparative cri-
teria, it had undergone a qualitative change. In early cases, it primar-
ily involved concentration of media ownership, i.e., the likelihood of
monopolization of media interests of a given community in the hands
of a single applicant.51 Such an allegation could be rebutted by a
showing of intense competition in the community sufficient to preclude
such a concentration and to assure a diversity of ideas."2 By the
1950's, the ownership issue had expanded to include diversification of
control, a positive policy of assuring maximum diversity of ideas
through the diffusion of media ownership.53  This criterion was
49. 230 F.2d 204 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1007 (1956). Judge Pretty-
man, writing for the majority, stated in passing, "In the case at bar there appears some
suggestion that the Commission has changed, or is changing, its view as to the dominant
importance of local ownership and as to the evil of a concentration of the media of mass
information." Id. at 206.
50. See Commissioner Robert E. Lee's dissent in Young People's Church of the Air,
Inc., 28 F.C.C. 617, 623 (1960), vacated, 36 F.C.C. 1127 (1964), in which he objected
to the overemphasis given the diversification issue by the majority, contrasting it to past
practice where it was "only one of the factors to be weighed and considered in a com-
parative proceeding." Id. at 624. The Commissioner instead took the traditional view
that, in light of the ultimate goal of service to the public, there was no danger to diver-
sity of viewpoint where the concentrative effect of multiple ownership would be pre-
cluded by the existence of a large number of competing stations in the same commu-
nity. Id. at 621.
51. See Carolina Advertising Corp., 6 F.C.C. 230, 235 (1938); Woto Knight, Jr.,
4 F.C.C. 182, 185 (1937); cf. East Tex. Broadcasting Co. (KGKB), 2 F.C.C. 402, 408-
09 (1936).
52. See, e.g., Television Broadcasters, Inc., 27 F.C.C. 727, 759 (1959), where the
significance of a "slight preference" awarded to applicants opposing the owner of a
Beaumont, Tex., radio station was "minimized" by the fact that three other stations were
operating in the city. See also Wabash Valley Broadcasting Corp. (WTHI-TV), 35
F.C.C. 686, 710 (1960) (hearing examiner), affd, 35 F.C.C. 677, 1 P & F. Radio Reg.
2d 573 (1963), where a hearing examiner rejected the diversification issue raised against
multiple owner Wasbash because there was "no evidence of any joint policies or joint
operations of both Wabash's stations and the newspapers, or of any attempts on its part
to suppress or distort news, or of its otherwise engaging in undesirable activity by reason
of its control of several communications outlets in a single city."
53. On diversification of control, see Grand Broadcasting Co., 37 F.C.C. 803, 809,
3 P & F Radio Reg. 2d 779, 789 (1964), where the Commission stated: "[O]ur diversi-
fication policy is intended to insure that the listening and viewing public will receive
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deemed inherently desirable and, as it was not tied to the question of
media competition, was not susceptible to the same defense as con-
centration of ownership-the existence of intense competition in the
community of license. 54 However, it was at first accorded no greater
weight than the other comparative criteria, and hence its effect could
be offset by preferences earned on other comparative issues.5"
With the Commission's formulation of the 1965 Policy Statement,
however, the diversification criterion was elevated to equal status
with "service to the public" (e.g., programming) as one of the "two
primary objectives toward which the process of comparison should be
directed."'56 After the 1965 Policy Statement, diversification of control
became in effect the single most important comparative criterion, under
which a demerit could no longer be offset by preferences from lesser
criteria. Under this policy objective, the following factors are con-
sidered:
(1) The extent of an applicant's interest in or control of other
media; and
(2) the nature of such media, including:
(a) geographical proximity to the community of service;
(b) the extent of coverage in -terms of land area and audi-
ence size (or circulation in the case of newspapers); and
(c) the significance of other media interests in comparison
with competing media in their own communities."
Under the original goal of public service, the Commission has included
many of the usual comparative criteria:
(1) The extent to which an applicant intends to participate in the
active operation of the station (i.e., integration of ownership and
management). Within this category, the following sub-criteria are
considered:
(a) the amount of time to be spent by the applicant in
operation of the station;
(b) the degree of responsibility to be assumed, gauged by
formal management positions to be held by the applicant;
and
information from diverse and independent sources and its application is not limited to
the avoidance of area concentration of control."
54. McClatchy Broadcasting Co., 19 F.C.C. 343, 379-80 (1954).
55. Id. at 380; Tennessee Television, Inc. v. FCC, 262 F.2d 28, 31 (D.C. Cir.
1958).
56. 1 F.C.C.2d at 394, 5 P & F Radio Reg. 2d at 1908.
57. Id. at 394-95, 5 P & F Radio Reg. 2d at 1908-09.
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(c) the attributes of the applicant, including previous broad-
cast experience and local residence in the principal com-
munity of service;58
(2) the programming proposed;59
(3) past broadcast records;60
(4) efficient proposed use of the frequency; 61 and
(5) the moral character of the applicant. 02
In addition to offering a predetermined list of factors upon which
differences between applicants could be evaluated, the 1965 Policy
Statement also .endowed these factors with relative weights indepen-
dent of the facts of any particular case. Hence, diversification of con-
trol is accorded "primary significance,"6' 8 while integration of owner-
ship and management is given "substantial importance,"6 presumably
a lesser weight. Under the latter category, full-time owner participa-
tion in station affairs is accorded the most credit, while less than "sub-
stantial" participation is given no credit. 5 Owners occupying staff posi-
tions in the station organization area are given the greatest credit, where-
as consultative positions are given no credit."6 Previous broadcast expe-
rience is accorded only "minor significance" since "emphasis upon this
element could discourage qualified newcomers to broadcasting, and
since experience generally confers only an initial advantage.167 On the
other hand, local residence for several years in the principal community
of service is deemed to have "primary importance";6 1 this criterion ap-
parently is grounded on the assumption that an applicant situated
therein has a better grasp of the needs and interests of his community
than one living beyond its borders or new to the area.
The 1965 Policy Statement represents the direct antithesis of the
doctrine expostulated in Johnston Broadcasting."9 While the latter
spoke of the "difficulty, if not the impossibility, of defining a list of
things in respect to which applicants may differ, '70 the former does just
58. Id. at 395-96, 5 P & F Radio Reg. 2d at 1909-10.
59. Id. at 397, 5 P & F Radio Reg. 2d at 1911.
60. Id. at 398, 5 P & F Radio Reg. 2d at 1912.
61. Id., 5 P & F Radio Reg. 2d at 1913.
62. Id. at 399, 5 P & F Radio Reg. 2d at 1913.
63. Id. at 394, 5 P & F Radio Reg. 2d at 1908.
64. Id. at 395, 5 P & F Radio Reg. 2d at 1909.
65. Id., 5 P & F Radio Reg. 2d at 1909.
66. Id., 5 P & F Radio Reg. 2d at 1909-10.
67. Id. at 396, 5 P & F Radio Reg. 2d at 1910.
68. Id., 5 P & F Radio Reg. 2d at 1910.
69. See notes 18-22 supra and accompanying text.
70. 175 F.2d at 358.
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that. Instead of determining the relative importance of such criteria
on a case-by-case basis as advocated in Johnston Broadcasting,7 the
Commission assigns them weights for uniform application in all cases.
Moreover, the 1965 Policy Statement goes a step further. While
Johnston Broadcasting called for consideration of every material dif-
ference between applicants, 72 the 1965 Policy Statement seeks to limit
the introduction of evidence primarily to the three basic ownership cri-
teria automatically designated for hearing: diversification of control,
integration of ownership and management, and the owner's local resi-
dence in the community of intended service. 73  Other issues such as
proposed programming and past broadcast records must be shown to
reflect "material" and "substantial" differences between applicants in
order to be designated for hearing. 4 The burden of offering such
proof falls on the party seeking designation of the issue and admission
of the relevant evidence. In the area of programs, the Commission
has already determined the meaning of "material" and "substantial"-
for program proposals to become an issue, the offer of proof must es-
tablish a "superior devotion to public service"; 75 deficient proposals,
of course, would be fatal to the applicant under the absolute minimum
requirements for individual applicants.7 6  For past broadcast records
to be designated for hearing, the offer of proof must establish the ex-
tremes of performance, either "unusual" attention to, or failure to meet,
the public's needs and interest; 77 satisfactory performance is ignored
as average.78 Aside from limiting the volume of evidence for con-
sideration, the 1965 Policy Statement was designed to simplify the
hearing process in yet another way-to place primary emphasis upon
the "objective" ownershi criteria and thus to avoid the difficult subjec-
tive determination necessary in comparing programs.
Given the primary goal of simplifying the comparative hearing
process, it is not unsurprising that, as originally drafted by the Broad-
cast Bureau, the 1965 Policy Statement was to apply to renewal as well
as to new applicants. Objections by several members of the Commis-
sion (on the grounds that exclusion of prior broadcast records, except
where indicative of "unique" service, would be particularly unfair to
71. Id.
72. Id. at 357.
73. 1 F.C.C.2d at 397, 5 P & F Radio Reg. 2d at 1911.
74. Id. at 397-98, 5 P & F Radio Reg..2d at 1911-12.
75. Id. at 397, 5 P & F Radio Reg. 2d at 1911.
76. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
77. 1 F.C.C.2d at 398, 5 P & F Radio Reg. 2d at 1912.
78. Id., 5 P & F Radio Reg. 2d at 1912.
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incumbents) led to insertion of a footnote excluding "the somewhat
different problems" raised by a renewal applicant from the scope of
the 1965 Policy Statement.7 Ostensibly suggesting that no aspect of
the 1965 Policy Statement would be applicable to renewal applicants,
the footnote exclusion was whittled down considerably in Seven (7)
League Productions, Inc. (WIll) 80 to mean only that, while the same
comparative criteria would apply to renewal applicants, "the parties will
be free to urge any arguments they deem applicable concerning the
relative weight to be afforded the evidence bearing on the various com-
parative factors."8' By 1969, this distinction had been further reduced
when the Commission maintained that the renewal applicant also was
subject to the test of unusual service in order to have his past broad-
cast record designated for hearing.82  On reconsideration of the
WHDH decision, both the Commission88 and the court of appeals in
its affirmation84 upheld the original decision on the peculiar facts of
the case, namely, the fact that the renewal applicant had operated its
station for nearly twelve years on nothing but temporary authoriza-
tions, none of which had extended for the normal three-year license
period.85
The status of renewal applicants remained uncertain because of
the failure of the court of appeals to face the real issue head-on in
WHDH, namely, to determine the applicability of the 1965 Policy
Statement to this special class of applicants.8 6 However, language in
the majority opinion did suggest that, should the court face such an
issue in the future, it would have doubts on two accounts about exclu-
sion of an incumbent's satisfactory broadcast record under the aegis of
the 1965 Policy Statement:
(1) whether the Commission had "unlawfully interfered with
legitimate renewal expectancies implicit in the structure of the Act";817
79. Id. at 393 n.1, 5 P & F Radio Reg. 2d at 1907 n.1.
80. 1 F.C.C.2d 1597 (1965).
81. Id. at 1599.
82. WHDH, Inc., 16 F.C.C.2d 1, 9, 15 P & F Radio Reg. 2d 411, 424, af 'd sub
nom. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). In a strong dissent, Commissioner Lee argued that such
a requirement had the effect of applying the same relative weights to incumbents as to
new applicants, contrary to the 1965 Policy Statement exclusionary footnote and Seven
(7) League Productions. Id. at 24, 15 P & F Radio Reg. 2d at 435.
83. WHDH, Inc., 17 F.C.C.2d 856, 16 P & F Radio Reg. 2d 185 (1969).
84. Greater Boston Televisioji Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
85. Id. at 841.
86. Id. at 854.
87. Id,
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(2) whether "administrative discretion to deny renewal expect-
ancies. . . must not be reasonably confined by ground rules and stand-
1)ls88ards."s
Perhaps it was this language which encouraged a new group of
Commissioners to issue a 1970 Policy Statement,8 0 which in effect reaf-
firmed the practice applied in Hearst9" and Wabash Valley Broadcast-
ing Corp. (WTHI-TV)9' of granting an incumbent with a satisfactory
record a controlling preference. However, unlike the earlier cases, this
Statement unequivocally prescribed a two stage hearing procedure. The
sole question during the first stage would concern the incumbent's past
performance."2 Competing applicants at this stage could produce only
evidence pointing to deficiencies in the renewal applicant's record. Only
where the incumbent's broadcast record reflected minimal service (the
lowest permissible level of service to qualify for renewal in the absence
of competition) was the second stage-a full comparative hearing-
convened.9 3  It was this procedural format which proved to be the
Achilles heel of the 1970 Policy Statement, for the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals, in Citizens Communications Center v. FCC,9 4
promptly declared it invalid as violative of section 309(e) of the Com-
munications Act of 1934'5 as interpreted by Ashbacker Radio Co. v.
FCC.9 While Ashbacker involved a comparative hearing between two
new applicants, it had come to stand for the general principle in ad-
ministrative law that "where two or more applications for permits of
licenses are mutually exclusive, the Commission must conduct one full
comparative hearing of the applications. ' 97 As the Citizens Communi-
cations Center court rightly pointed out, the first stage, as set forth in
the 1970 Policy Statement, "converted the comparative hearing into
a petition to deny proceeding."98  The court went on to indicate, in
quoting from Johnston Broadcasting, that a full comparative hearing
within the meaning of sections 309(a) and (e) of the Communications
Act of 1934 necessarily involved evaluation of all material differences
88. Id.
89. 22 F.C.C.2d 424, 18 P & F Radio Reg. 2d 1901 (1970).
90. See notes 34-37 supra and accompanying text.
91. 35 F.C.C. 677, 709 (1946).
92. See 22 F.C.C.2d at 425, 18 P & F Radio Reg. 2d at 1904-05.
93. See id. at 425-26, 18 P & F Radio Reg. 2d at 1905.
94. 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
95. 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1970).
96. 326 U.S. 327 (1945).
97. 447 F.2d at 1211.
98. Id. at 1210 n.28.
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between competing applicants: "The Commission cannot ignore a ma-
terial difference between two applicants and make findings in respect
to selected characteristics only."99
Tm 1965 POLICY STATEMENT: A RETROSPECTIVE CRITIQUE
While the court in Citizens Communications Center narrowly
based its holding on the requirement of a full comparative hearing, 100
by way of dictum it uncritically endorsed the Commission's 1965 Policy
Statement and that Statement's applicability -to incumbents.101 By so
doing, the court ignored the double-edged applicability of Ashbacker
and Johnston Broadcasting to the selective admissibility of material evi-
dence practiced under the 1965 Policy Statement. Where evidence
is not relevant to one of the few issues automatically designated for
hearing, the 1965 Policy Statement places the onerous burden of secur-
ing admission of such evidence upon the party offering it."'2 Aside
from this obstacle to a full hearing on all material differences between
applicants, there is an even more serious shortcoming regarding the
standard for the admissibility of evidence. "Admissible" evidence is
that which reflects a material difference between applicants. 03 Under
the pre-1965 doctrine, a "material" difference indicated that one of the
applicants was likely to provide better service to the public than an-
other.104  Assuming satisfaction by all parties of the minimal pre-
requisites for individual applicants, the test of "better than" was strictly
a relative standard; as such, one applicant's programming-past and
proposed-must have been determined to be better than another's, al-
though from an absolute point of view neither's may have been very
inspired nor much above the minimum standard for individuals. In
contrast, the standard of admissibility (and hence of materiality) for
99. Id. at 1212, quoting Johnston Broadcasting Co., 175 F.2d 351, 357 (D.C. Cir.
1949).
100. 447 F.2d at 1212 n.33.
101. Id. at 1213.
102. See notes 73-78 supra and accompanying text.
103. The offer of proof requirement for all but four of the comparative criteria may
discourage applicants from making the effort; furthermore, the 1965 Policy Statement
presumes that such an issue, not material when proferred, may not later become material
in light of subsequent evidence. In so doing it seemingly places sole responsibility on
the applicant to raise such additional issues, this despite the fact that, as the guardian
of the public interest in broadcasting, the Commission has an affirmative duty to utilize
its own staff and expertise to supplement the record where relevant evidence is not ad-
duced by the parties. Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 96 F. Supp. 883, 892 (S.D.N.Y.
1951), aff'd by an equally divided Court sub nom. Rederi v. Isbrandtsen Co., 342 U.S.
950 (1952).
104. Johnston Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 175 F.2d 351, 357 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
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past program evidence under the 1965 Policy Statement is "unusual"
performance; 105 the standard for proposed program evidence is "su-
perior devotion to public service."'1 6 Both of these standards under
the 1965 Policy Statement are not only stricter than the "materiality"
test of "better than," they are absolute rather than relative, in violation
of the dual requirements set forth in Johnston Broadcasting, namely,
(1) that "[c]omparative qualities and not mere positive character-
istics" be considered; 10 7 and
(2) that "an over-all relative determination upon an evaluation
of all factors" be reached.108
Therefore, on the issue of past and proposed programming, once
deemed the "essence of comparative service to the public,"'1 9 the ap-
plicant is now in effect denied a full comparative hearing.
The court in Citizens Communications Center also briefly con-
sidered congressional intent involving the comparative procedure for
treating renewal applicants, in particular the language of section 307
(d) of the Communications Act, as amended in 1952.110 In noting that
Congress had removed language specifying that renewal applications
were to be judged by the "same considerations and practice" as new
applications, the court conjectured that such a change was made
"[plerhaps to guard against the inference that an incumbentes past
broadcast record could not be considered at all at renewal time
.... ",1 This court's suggestion is essentially correct, as far as it goes,
in light of House"' and Senate" 3 Committee Reports explaining the
modification. The Senate Committee Report, for example, stated that
the change in statutory language in no way impaired the Commission's
"right and duty to consider, in the case of a station which has been
in operation and is applying for renewal, the overall performance of
that station against the broad standard of public interest, convenience,
and necessity.""' 4  "Overall performance' by a renewal applicant in
the public interest can only be interpreted to mean past service to the
public, the essence of which is past programming, as defined in Johns-
105. 1 F.C.C.2d at 398, 5 P & F Radio Reg. 2d at 1912.
106. Id. at 397, 5 P & F Radio Reg. 2d at 1911.
107. 175 F.2d at 356.
108. Id. at 357 (emphasis added).
109. Id. at 359.
110. See notes 41-42 supra and accompanying text.
111. 447 F.2d at 1206 n.13.
112. H.R. REP. No. 1750, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1952).
113. S. REP. No. 44, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1951).
114. Id. (emphasis added).
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ton Broadcasting."" Even more telling is the explanation for amend-
ing the language of section 307(d) given by the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce:
The committee feels that the quoted language [that renewal applicants
should be adjudged by the same criteria as new applicants] is neither
realistic nor does it reflect the way in which the Commission actually
has handled renewal cases. Therefore, this subsection of the bill strikes
out the quoted language, and in lieu thereof provides that. . . any re-
newal applied for may be granted "if the Commission finds that the
public interest, convenience, and necessity would be served thereby."'116
The above reference to the actual practice of the Commission could
only be referring to the comparative criterion of a renewal applicant's
past program record for the following reasons:
(1) Contemporary cases at that time emphasized the primary im-
portance of programs 17 and specifically the incumbent's past record
of programs'" in a comparative evaluation; and
(2) there is no other comparative criterion, inappropriate to the
new applicant, which would necessitate deletion of language subjecting
both new and renewal applicants to evaluation under the "same corn-
siderations and practice."" 9
After the demise of the 1970 Policy Statement, it can still be ar-
gued that the 1965 Policy Statement, now applicable to renewal appli-
cants by virtue of Seven (7) League Productions'2 and WHDH,'21
permits consideration of an incumbent's past broadcast record,, 2 but
under limited circumstances. Nevertheless, the 1965 Policy Statement
does deny this factor the weight accorded it by Congress in the 1952
amendments to section 307(d) 23 and by the Commission itself, which
earlier declared the incumbent's broadcast record "indicative of an
ability to maintain or improve the acceptable service."'12 The court
in Citizens Communications Center also acknowledged the impor-
tance of this criterion in admitting that "incumbent licensees should be
judged primarily on their records of past performance.' 2 5
115. 175 F.2d at 359.
116. H.R. REP. No. 1750, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1952).
117. See Johnston Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 175 F.2d 351, 359 (1949).
118. Hearst Radio, Inc. (WBAL), 15 F.C.C. 1149 (1951).
119. See notes 38-42 supra and accompanying text.
120. See notes 80-81 supra and accompanying text.
121. See note 82 supra and accompanying text.
122. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
123. Act of July 15, 1952, ch. 879, § 5, 66 Stat. 714. See notes 41-42, 112-16 supra
and accompanying text.
124. Hearst Radio, Inc. (WBAL), 15 F.C.C. 1149, 1176 (1951).
125. 447 F.2d at 1213.
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In assessing the 1965 Policy Statement, it is necessary to consider
the Commission's current heavy emphasis on the ownership criteria
(diversification of media control, integration of ownership and manage-
ment, and local residence of the owner-applicant), 20 which are ap-
plicable to new and renewal applicants alike. Since "comparative ser-
vice to the listening public is the vital element," 27 it would seem logical
that the relevance and materiality of evidence relating to the ownership
criteria be measured in terms of the benefit or harm in an applicant's
service to the public, past and prospective. However, under these
automatically designated ownership issues, no such showing is neces-
sary; the evidence is apparently assumed to be relevant. The result,
illustrated by the decision in Theodore Granik,2 8 can be meaningless
as well as arbitrary. There Granik, one of three competing applicants,
was accorded a controlling preference on each of the ownership cri-
teria. Specifically, said applicant was found to have been a long-time
resident of the intended community of license (the District of Colum-
bia) where he was affiliated with numerous civic, social, and religious
organizations. 129  No effort was made by the Review Board to deter-
mine how these factors would assist the applicant in providing better
service to the public than his competitors.
The Board also noted that one of the competitors owned two
broadcast stations in Puerto Rico and a Spanish language newspaper
based in New York City. 30 This alone was deemed sufficient reason
to accord that competitor a demerit on the diversification issue despite
the fact that no showing was made as to how this instance of multiple
ownership was likely to detract from his service to the District of Co-
lumbia community, 13' and despite the fact that his ascertainment of
community needs was superior to that of the other applicants. This
latter fact itself belies the assumption upon which the preference for
local residency and involvement in community affairs is based, namely,
126. 1 F.C.C.2d at 397, 5 P & F Radio Reg. 2d at 1911.
127. Johnston Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 175 F.2d 351, 359 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
128. 8 F.C.C.2d 1068, 10 P & F Radio Reg. 2d 659 (1967).
129. Id. at 1076, 10 P & F Radio Reg. 2d at 670-71.
130. Id. at 1073, 10 P & F Radio Reg. 2d at 667.
131. In reaching this conclusion, the Board reversed the hearing examiner, who had
determined that the applicant's other media interests were irrelevant since they were
"geographically removed" from the Washington, D.C. area. In so doing, the Board re-
lied upon the following language of the 1965 Policy Statement: "Other interests in the
principal community proposed to be served will normally be of most significance, fol-
lowed by other interests in the remainder of the proposed service area and, finally, gen-
erally in the United States.," Id. at 1073, 10 P & F Radio Reg. 2d at 667 (emphasis
in original), quoting Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d
393, 394-95, 5 P & F Radio Reg. 2d 1901, 1908-09 (1965).
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that such involvement allows the broadcast owner to better realize the
needs and problems of his community in order to serve them. Al-
though Granik was granted such a preference, one of his competitors-
a permanent resident of New York' 32-was in fact better able to detect
the needs of the District of Columbia and prescribe programs to meet
those needs. 1 3  The Board, however, disregarded this consideration
in mechanically applying the 1965 Policy Statement, and it concluded
-that "the credit accorded under this factor [the superior ascertainment
of community needs] is insufficient to overcome the marked prefer-
ences accorded the other applicants in the vital areas of diversifica-
tion and integration."'31 4  If the Granik case suggests that application
of the 1965 Policy Statement bears little or no resemblance to reality,
the 1941 Hawaiian Broadcasting Systems, Ltd. 5 case suggests a fac-
tual situation where application of the 1965 Policy Statement would
result in an even more serious rejection of reality. In that case a
broadcast license was granted to a party already owning two of four
radio stations in the Hawaiian Islands because of its proposal to provide
needed foreign language programs to a large number of non-English
speaking inhabitants. Consider the possible result in a comparative
situation under the 1965 Policy Statement.3 6 One can easily see how
the diversification issue, as applied in the Granik case, could control
to deny such a valuable program service.
With its emphasis upon "objective" factors involving ownership
patterns, the 1965 Policy Statement is fatally deficient both procedur-
ally and substantively in comparative hearings involving both new and
renewal applicants. With regard to procedure, the District of Colum-
bia Circuit Court of Appeals has noted that
as a general matter, the federal regulatory agencies should construe
pleadings filed before them so as to raise rather than avoid important
questions. They "should not adopt procedures that foreclose full in-
quiry into broad public interest questions, either patent or latent."',3
Even more on point, this same court in Citizens Communications
Center declared invalid the Commission's 1970 Policy Statement on
132. 8 F.C.C.2d at 1077, 10 P & F Radio Reg. 2d at 671.
133. Id. at 1079, 10 P & F Radio Reg. 2d at 673.
134. Id. at 1079, 10 P & F Radio Reg. 2d at 674.
135. 8 F.C.C. 379 (1941).
136. It is recognized that Hawaiian Broadcasting Systems concerned a single appli-
cant. The facts of the case are borrowed here for the purpose of demonstrating the un-
fortunate result which could be reached in a comparative situation under the 1965 Policy
Statement.
137. Retail Store Employees Local 880 v. FCC, 436 F.2d 248, 254 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
quoting Midwestern Gas Transmission Co. v. FPC, 258 F.2d 660, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
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-the grounds that preference for the incumbent rendering "substantial"
service denies competing applicants a full hearing within section 309
(e) of the Communications Act and Ashbacker. 8s Likewise, the ob-
stacles raised by the 1965 Policy Statement to a comparative evaluation
of programming, past and proposed, deny both new and incumbent
applicants an opportunity to be heard on the one issue most directly
affecting the public interest; while the method of ownership may in-
directly affect the licensee's capability of serving the needs of his com-
munity, it is the nature of the programs themselves which is the essence
of that service.2 9
With regard to substance, the Commission, by opting for compara-
tive criteria which avoid the difficult subjective evaluation of programs,
is guilty of just that practice described by Professor Davis in his Ad-
ministrative Law Treatise: "Perhaps one of the most common de-
ficiencies [of administrative hearings] is the tendency to develop issues
of policy as if they were issues of fact.' 140  Obviously, the Commission
has the authority to determine that, as a matter of policy, diversity of
viewpoint is in the public interest.' 41 Tn pursuing this policy, the Com-
mission may consider diversification of control among the comparative
factors evaluated in weighing public interest, convenience, and neces-
sity.' 42 It may not as a matter of abstract policy, however, presume
that diversification of control encourages competition and hence assures
a diversity of ideas. This assumes an empirical basis which, by the
Commission's own admission, does not exist.' 43 Without such a basis,
this confusion of policy and fact has resulted in an arbitrary determina-
tion of the specific means for achieving the ultimate goal-service in
the public interest.' 4 The incorrectness of this approach was early
138. 447 F.2d at 1211-12. See notes 93-98 supra and accompanying text.
139. See Johnston Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 175 F.2d 351, 359 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
140. 1 K. DAvis, ADMINiSTPATIVE LAw TREATISE § 8.13, at 578 (1958).
141. See Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1213-14 n.36
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
142. Id.
143. In re Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 6 P & F Radio Reg.
2d 96a (1965). See also Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1
F.C.C.2d 393, 402, 5 P & F Radio Reg. 2d 1901, 1916 (1965) (Commissioner Hyde,
dissenting).
144. Note subsequent Commissioners' dissatisfaction with the diversification issue as
a matter of policy, expressed in the 1970 Policy Statement, 22 F.C.C.2d 424, 18 P &
F Radio Reg. 2d 1901 (1970), in which the majority concluded that such an issue
"should be the subject of general rulemaking proceedings rather than ad hoc decisions
in renewal hearings." Id. at 428, 18 P & F Radio Reg. 2d at 1907-08. See also Colum-
bus Broadcasting Coalition v. FCC, 505 F.2d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1974), in which the Com-
mission decided that, pending a rulemaking proceeding on broadcast licensee ownership
of newspapers, it will only consider the diversification issue if the party raising such a
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stated by the United States Supreme Court in FCC v. RCA Com-
munications, Inc. 4r There the majority observed that, while an ap-
plicant need not demonstrate tangible benefits derived from the in-
creased competition of its entry into the field, "it is not too much to
ask that there be ground for reasonable expectation that competition
may have some beneficial effect. Merely to assume that competition
is bound to be of advantage . . . is not enough." '146 While this par-
ticular statement concerned a common carrier 47 rather than a broad-
cast applicant, its significance is nowise lessened, given the fact that
licensees in both areas must meet the ultimate test of service in the
public interest, are closely regulated by the Commission, and are in
fields of communications closed to all but a select number of qualified
licensees.
In the limited area of licensee ownership of newspapers, the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit appears to have implicitly accepted the Su-
preme Court's dictum in RCA Communications by requiring that the
diversificaton of control issue be raised only where specific abuses by
the multiple owner are alleged. 148 In its now defunct 1970 Policy
Statement, the Commission sought to go a step further by eliminating
the diversification issue entirely from the comparative hearing, finding
it more appropriately an issue to be resolved by "general rulemaking
proceedings rather than ad hoc decisions in renewal hearings."'14
While the Commission was careful to limit its change of heart to re-
newal applicants only' 8°-thereby avoiding overruling the 1965 Policy
Statement-the reasons given for its decision are equally as valid for
new applicants. First, the Commission acknowledged that the diversi-
fication issue would have a significant effect on the broadcast industry
as a whole, and that such a substantive matter was more appropriately
the domain of a general rulemaking proceeding.I5 ' Second, the Com-
mission suggested that multiple ownership was an unfair and unsound
basis for denial of a license to an otherwise qualified applicant-unfair
because the applicant could well be in conformity with the Commis-
sion's multiple ownership rules; 52 and unsound because such a policy,
claimed advantage alleges specific facts which tend to show the multiple owner guilty
of abuses not in the public interest. Id. at 325.
145. 346 U.S. 86 (1953).
146. id. at 97.
147. See id. at 87-88.
148. Columbus Broadcasting Coalition v. FCC, 505 F.2d 320, 325 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
149. 22 F.C.C.2d at 428, 18 P & F Radio Reg. 2d at 1908.
150. Id. at 426-27, 18 P & F Radio Reg. 2d at 1906.
151. Id. at 427-28, 18 P & F Radio Reg. 2d at 1907-08.
152. Id. at 427, 18 P & F Radio Reg. 2d at 1907.
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independent of program service, would tend to discourage qualified
applicants from entering or remaining in the broadcast field." 3
The emphasis upon ownership criteria to the near exclusion of
programming issues, ostensibly designed to encourage competition and
diversity in the broadcast industry, in effect tends artifically to eliminate
differences in the comparative proceeding itself. The Commission in
its WHDH decision endorsed limited (only where "unusual") use of
an applicant's past record of performance,
for otherwise new applicants competing with a renewal applicant would
be placed at a disadvantage if the renewal applicant entered the con-
test with a built-in lead arising from the fact that it has a record as an
operating station. More importantly, the public interest is better served
when the foundations for determining the best practicable service, as be-
tween renewal and new applicant, are more nearly equal at their out-
set.' 54
Previous broadcast experience is accorded "minor significance" be-
cause "emphasis upon this element could discourage qualified new-
comers to broadcasting ... ,"L5 In attempting to make new and re-
newal applicants subject only to those comparative issues which they
have in common, the Commission is in effect artifically equalizing their
competitive status. The natural comparative advantages which an in-
cumbent may have, based on previous broadcast experience (e.g.,
more practical program proposals and a more realistic assessment of
the financing necessary for the kind of operation anticipated) are vir-
tually ignored. In fact, previous broadcast experience is unconvincingly
put down as conferring "only an initial advantage"' 56 which is "re-
mediable," 5 7 despite the fact that the Commission had earlier recog-
nized the importance of this factor insofar as "it deals with knowledge
. . . as to how the facility can best be used in the course of day-
to-day operation, to serve the interests and desires of a community.' s8
This built-in advantage was recognized in Ashbacker'6 9 and most re-
cently accepted as a fact of life in Citizens Communications Center,60°
153. Id. at 428, 18 P & F Radio Reg. 2d at 1907: "Mhe stability of a large
percentage of the broadcast industry. . . would be undermined by such a policy."
154. WHDH, Inc., 16 F.C.C.2d 1, 10 (1969), affd sub nom. Greater Boston Televi-
sion Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
155. Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 396, 5
P & F Radio Reg. 2d 1901, 1910 (1965).
156. Id. at 396, 5 P & F Radio Reg. 2d at 1910.
157. Id. at 396 n.8, 5 P & F Radio Reg. 2d at 1910 n.8.
158. Television Broadcasters, Inc., 27 F.C.C. 727, 761 (1959).
159. 326 U.S. at 332.
160. 447 F.2d at 1213.
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wherein the court admitted that "in a renewal proceeding, a new ap-
plicant is under a greater burden to 'make the comparative showing
necessary to displace an establshed licensee.' "161 For the Commission
to de-emphasize these actual comparative advantages, as practiced un-
der the 1965 Policy Statement, is to be guilty of the same maladminis-
tration for which it was criticized in its regulation of common carriers
in the recent case of Hawaiian Telephone Co. v. FCC:0 2
Yet it is all too embarrassingly apparent that the Commission has been
thinking about competition, not in terms primarily as to its benefit to the
public, but specifically with the objective of equalizing competition
among competitors.
This is not the objective or role assigned by law to the Federal
Communications Commission. As a result of focusing first on competi-
tors, next on competition, and then on the public interest, the FCC has
given scant attention to the question of public convenience and neces-
sity, and therefore has not met its statutorily imposed duty.'0 3
The Commission, as regulator of broadcast licensees, likewise has
a statutory duty to select applicants who will best serve the public inter-
est. It tends, however, to ignore this fundamental test in the broadcast
area by basing its selection process on the general policy of encouraging
competition through greater diversification of media control, without
tying such an issue to the public interest considerations of the specific
case. In Hawaiian Telephone Co. the court remanded the case to the
Commission for specific findings that the public interest would indeed
be served by granting the applicant authority to engage in expanded
service;1 4 the same court, however, has not required such a specific
showing under the 1965 Policy Statement. In Granik, the demerit
given a radio applicant for the District of Columbia, because of his
ownership of broadcast stations in Puerto Rico and of a national Span-
ish-language newspaper located in New York City, was based on the
fact that his competitors had no other media ownership interests." 5
Under the doctrine of Hawaiian Telephone, this demerit would have
been removed for failure of the Commission to show how the multiple
ownership interests adversely affected that applicant's ability to serve
the public interest in the District of Columbia community. As sug-
gested by the court in Hawaiian Telephone, this failure to tie "objec-
tive" ownership criteria to specific facts indicative of the public interest
161. Id., quoting Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327, 332 (1945).
162. 498 F.2d 771 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
163. Id. at 775-76 (emphasis in original).
164. Id. at 777-78.
165. See notes 128-34 supra and accompanying text.
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is to violate a statutory duty expressed in sections 307(d) and 309(e),
inter alia, of the Communications Act.166
CONCLUSIONS
The ultimate issue which the Commission must address in apply-
ing the statutory test where there are competing broadcast applicans
is who will best serve the public interest, convenience, and necessity.
To give meaning and purpose to hearings required by law, this test
must be applied in the light of the facts of the case under consideration,
not in terms of the general public interest in such abstract principles
as competition, diversity of ownership, and local ownership. The Com-
mission's inquiry must relate to the needs and characteristics of the par-
ticular community which the applicants are competing to serve. It is
for this reason that Johnston Broadcasting advocated a case-by-case ap-
proach, believing it impossible to measure the effect of proposed ser-
vice in a community by a set of fixed, preconceived criteria.
The impossibility of success in such an attempt at uniformity has
been shown in the above text. First, evidence generated according
to the standardized criteria may be incomplete, for it may ignore the
possibility that in a particular case material differences between ap-
plicants do not fall within the preconceived comparative categories.
Second, the weights attached in the abstract to these preconceived cri-
teria also may not truly reflect the relative priorities of a particular com-
munity's needs and hence may fail to realistically ascertain which appli-
cant is best able to satisfy those needs. In short, policy has been substi-
tuted for facts, and preconceived objective criteria have pre-empted the
statutory test of the public interest. Thus, for example, the automatic
preference accorded local applicants disregards the possibility that, de-
pending on the facts of a particular case, a competitor's proposed use
of a professional employee-manager from outside the community
might very well bring imagination, an appreciation of the role of jour-
nalism, and sensitivity to social issues far exceeding that of a particular
local owner-manager.
There are two objections which will probably be argued against
returning to the case-by-case approach prescribed by Johnston Broad-
casting. First, this approach lacks certainty of outcome, which the
1965 Policy Statement seemed to provide.16 7 However, it is this same
166. 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(d), 309(e) (1970).
167. See, e.g., Jaffe, supra note 9. Professor Jaffe asserted that the 1965 Policy
Statement rejected the "fantastic gamesmanship" inherent in the pre-1965 comparative
process whereby criteria "so vague and so various that decisions not only unpredictable
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
certainty which has threatened the stability of the broadcast industry,
a fact recognized by the Commissioners in the 1970 Policy State,
ment.. 8  Furthermore, it is this certainty which allows the competing
applicant to tailor his organization and proposals in such a way as to
satisfy preconceived preferences and thus prevail over competitors who
are either tied to prior records as incumbents or are multiple owners.
With all its emphasis upon competition, the 1965 Policy Statement, in
effect, would seem to discourage new and renewal applicants from con-
stanfly seeking to improve the quality of their service. In short, the
comparative test as to which applicant is best able to serve defies pre-
conceived certainties. As stated in Johnston Broadcasting, it is the
purpose of the comparative hearing to make such a determination.
The second objection, the difficulty and unwieldiness of compar-
ing all manner of differences between applicants, 169 is not to be denied.
However, the purpose of an administrative hearing is to organize the
evidence submitted and to compile a factual record which embodies
the material differences between applicants so that a decision can be
made which will be fair to the parties and in the public interest.
but often inexplicable" were used to award licenses. Id. at 1695. See also Friendly,
The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for Better Definition of Standards, 75
H V. L. REv. 863, 1055, 1062-68 (1962); Irion, FCC Criteria for Evaluating Compet-
lug Applicants, 43 MrN. L. PEv. 479, 482-83, 489-91 (1959); Schwartz, Comparative
Television and the Chancellor's Foot, 47 Gzo. L. 655, 678-89 (1959).
168. See 22 F.C.C. at 425, 18 P & F Radio Reg. 2d at 1904.
169. See Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 394,
5 P & F Radio Reg. 2d 1901, 1908 (1965). See also J. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULA-
TORY AGENCIES TO THE PREsiDENT-ELECT 22 (1960) ("Observers of the procedures em-.
ployed by the [Federal Communications] Commission agree that the issues litigated are
unreal and a mass of useless evidence, expensive to prepare, is required to be adduced."
Id. at 53.); Anthony, supra note 16, at 32; Friendly, supra note 167, at 1060.
[Vol. 19.75:253
